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Abstract
We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing
similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of
this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the
static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous
costs. In the dynamic game with uncertain market demand, firms of different sizes have different
lifetime capacities which deplete over time according to the market demand for their good. We
setup the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game and its associated system of HJB partial
differential equations in the case of linear demand functions. We characterize certain qualitative
features of the game using an asymptotic approximation in the limit of small competition. The
equilibrium of the game is further studied using numerical solutions. We find that consumers
benefit the most when a market is structured with many firms of the same relative size producing
highly substitutable goods. However, a large degree of substitutability does not always lead to
large drops in price, for example when two firms have a large difference in their size.
1 Introduction
We study competitive markets with a small number of players in which firms use price as their
strategic variable in an uncertain demand environment. These are known as Bertrand oligopolies.
The firms are selling differentiated but substitutable goods. Many products, for instance consumer
goods, are sold in markets that fit this structure. An example might be Pepsi and Coca-Cola in
the market for soft drinks. Oil, coal and natural gas are commodities that can be substituted for
one another for energy production, but which have different prices per unit of energy produced.
In this paper, we analyze price setting competition in the case of differentiated goods, and
in continuous time under randomly fluctuating demands. These are nonzero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential games that may be characterized by systems of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDEs. The
large literature on oligopolistic competition deals primarily with the static problem, and we refer
to Friedman [18] and Vives [27] for background and references. Cournot [11] provided the first
analysis of an oligopoly where firms’ strategic interactions are taken into account. He assumed
that firms compete using quantity as their strategic variable and then take prices as determined
by the market through an inverse demand function, that is, a mapping from quantity to price. In
a scathing review of Cournot’s paper, Bertrand [7] argued that firms compete using price as their
strategic variable and then produce to clear the market demand arising from a demand function,
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that is, a mapping from price to quantity. In actuality, some markets may be better modeled as
Cournot, and others as Bertrand, and we do not enter that debate here.
In both these original models, however, the goods were homogeneous, that is perfectly substi-
tutable. This means that the only difference between the firms is the price they set or the quantity
they produce. In the price setting game, this induces the behavior that, if the prices between
two goods are not equal, consumers will only purchase the lower priced good. Here, we do not
assume goods are perfectly substitutable, and therefore, if firms have prices that differ, they may
all still receive some demand from the market. Models of product differentiation originated with
Hotelling [23] and Chamberlin [10], and were extended by d’Aspremont et al. [12], among others.
See Friedman [18, Chapter 3] for an excellent discussion.
Most of the continuous-time models are in a linear-quadratic (LQ) set-up, which has convenient
analytical properties. We refer to Engwerda [15] for details, and Hamade`ne [20] for an approach
via BSDEs. Jun and Vives [24] work within the context of a differential game of a duopoly with
differentiated products. Their general model allows for either Cournot or Bertrand competition in
which the players control the rate of change of the rate of production or price, respectively, in the
LQ setting.
There has been much recent interest in other types of stochastic differential games. We mention,
for example, Lasry and Lions [25], who consider Mean Field Games in which there are a large number
of players and competition is felt only through an average of one’s competitors, with each player’s
impact on the average being negligible. Bensoussan et al. [6] study leader-follower differential
games in real options problems. Ekeland and Pirvu [14] and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [9] analyze time-
inconsistent control problems which can be viewed as games against one’s future self. Energy
markets in which a small number of firms control supply can be viewed as Cournot oligopolies and
they are analyzed in the context of exhaustible resources in Harris et al. [22].
The state variable of the firms in our model is their remaining lifetime capacity. This is a
quantity whose value at time zero represents all of the possible production a firm can undertake
over its lifetime before it goes out of business. The primary reason for this choice is that it is
a natural way to capture the notion of relative sizes of firms. A firm with a very large lifetime
capacity is a major market participant whose decisions greatly affect the prevailing price in the
market. A firm with a very small lifetime capacity has very little market power. Here, we analyze
the effect that participant size has on Bertrand markets over time. For producers of consumer
goods, the lifetime capacities could be proxied by past volume of sales projected forward into the
expected lifetime of the firm. In the case of exhaustible resources, the state variables would be
estimates of remaining oil, coal or natural gas reserves, for instance.
In Section 2, we set up the static version of our price setting game and prove the existence
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium price functions are inputs for
Section 3 where we present the dynamic Bertrand game. We characterize the price strategies of the
firms using the solution to a system of coupled nonlinear PDEs. We analyze in detail the problem
of a duopoly with linear demand functions and the related monopoly problem. Analytically, we
obtain an asymptotic expansion in powers of a parameter that represents the extent of competition
between the firms in a deterministic game. In Section 4, we present the numerical solution of our
system of PDEs that allows us to characterize the price strategies and resulting demands of firms
in the stochastic game. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude and discuss further lines of research.
2
2 Static Bertrand Game
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze a dynamic price setting game in continuous time.
In order to fully understand this game, we first analyze a static version of the game and prove
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. This is used in establishing the system of HJB
PDEs of the dynamic game in the next section.
We assume a market with N firms where each firm uses price as a strategic variable in noncoop-
erative competition with the remaining firms. Associated to each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is a variable
pi ∈ R+ that represents the price at which firm i offers its good for sale to the market. We denote
by p the vector of prices whose ith element is pi.
2.1 Systems of Demand
Given prices of the firms, we specify the resulting market demands for each firm’s good. For each
firm i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, there exists a demand function DNi (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) : RN+ → R. We first state
some natural properties of these demand functions.
Assumption 2.1 (Properties of Demand Functions). For all i = 1, . . . , N , DNi is smooth in all
variables, and
DNN (0, . . . , 0) > 0,
∂DNi
∂pi
< 0, and
∂DNi
∂pj
> 0 for i 6= j.
We further assume that firms are distinguished only by the prices they set.
Assumption 2.2 (Exchangeability of Firms). For fixed p1, . . . , pN and all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
DNi (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pj , . . . , pN ) = D
N
j (p1, . . . , pj , . . . , pi, . . . , pN ) .
This implies that the demand function is invariant under permutations of the other firms’ prices.
That is, for any j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} \ {i}, we have
DNi (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pj , . . . , pk . . . , pN ) = D
N
i (p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pk, . . . , pj . . . , pN ) .
Smoothness of these functions is for convenience, and, naturally, the market has positive demand
if the prices are low enough. The key assumption in the above is that demand for an individual
firm is decreasing in the firm’s own price and increasing in the price of their rivals. This assumption
implies that we only deal with substitute goods. A classical example is Coca-Cola versus Pepsi.
However, such goods can also be of different kinds and thus not directly replaceable, yet they still
exhibit substitutability. For example, an iPod and a compact disc. One cannot directly replace the
other, but we expect a drop in the price of iPods to cause a drop in the demand for compact discs.
Contrary to this type of good, there are goods known as complementary goods, such as hot dogs
and hot dog buns, but we do not consider those kinds of competition here.
We now make additional convenient assumptions.
Assumption 2.3 (Finite Choke Price). Fix a firm i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For any fixed set of prices
p−i , (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ), we assume there exists a “choke price”, pˆi (p−i) <∞, such that
DNi (p1, . . . , pi−1, pˆi, pi+1, . . . , pN ) = 0. (1)
Note that this “choke price” is unique by Assumption 2.1 because ∂DNi /∂pi < 0. This price is
also positive by the same assumption and Assumption 2.2 because DNN (0, . . . , 0) = D
N
i (0, . . . , 0) >
DNi (0, . . . , 0, pˆ (0) , 0, . . . , 0) = 0. This implies pˆi (0) > 0.
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Remark 2.1. For example, suppose each firm’s demand depends on its rivals’ prices only through
their sum: DNi = f
(
pi,
∑
j 6=i pj
)
where f(x, y) : R+ × R+ → R is a smooth function which is
increasing in y, decreasing in x, and such that there exists a solution x to f(x, y) = 0 for every y.
Then, it is easy to see that this demand system satisfies Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
The actual demand that each firm faces cannot be negative as the firms are suppliers. For a
fixed price vector p, we define Di(p), without the superscript, as the actual demand firm i receives
in the market. Suppose first, for simplicity, that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN . If this is not the case, then
we can re-order the firms, carry out the following procedure, and then return them to their original
order once their demands have been determined. We next show that if prices are ordered, then this
same ordering carries over to the demands.
Proposition 2.1 (Price order implies demand order). Fix a vector of prices p. Suppose they are
ordered such that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN . Then,
DN1 (p1, . . . , pN ) ≥ DN2 (p1, . . . , pN ) ≥ · · · ≥ DNN (p1, . . . , pN ) .
Proof. Using the ordering of the prices, the properties of the derivatives of the demand functions,
and Assumption 2.2, we have
DNN (p1, . . . , pN−2, pN−1, pN ) = D
N
N−1 (p1, . . . , pN−2, pN , pN−1)
≤ DNN−1 (p1, . . . , pN−2, pN−1, pN−1)
≤ DNN−1 (p1, . . . , pN−2, pN−1, pN ) .
The result then follows for all DNi by applying the same procedure. 
To determine the actual demand Di(p), we begin with the demand function D
N
N (p1, p2, . . . , pN ).
If DNN (p) ≥ 0, then it must be the case that DNi (p) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N by Proposition 2.1.
The actual demand that each firm faces is DNi (p). Hence,
Di(p) = D
N
i (p) for all i = 1, . . . , N,
and all the demands are determined. Otherwise, if DNN (p) < 0, then the price pN is too high
relative to the preference structure of the market to make any sales in the market. Thus, this firm
will receive no demand from the market and the demand of the remaining firms must reflect this
fact. The demand for firm N is set to zero, DN (p) = 0, and the demand for the remaining firms is
determined by considering their residual demand functions, which we now define.
Let us consider the general case of residual demand for n firms when all firms i > n receive zero
demand at the current set of prices.
Definition 2.1 (Consistency of Demand). For each n ∈ [1, N − 1], we define the n-firm system of
demand functions from the (n+ 1)-firm system of demand functions through
Dni (p1, p2, . . . , pn) = D
n+1
i (p1, p2, . . . , pn, pˆn+1) for i = 1, . . . , n,
where pˆn+1 (p1, . . . , pn) is defined by D
n+1
n+1 (p1, . . . , pn, pˆn+1) = 0.
Definition 2.1 encapsulates that, if firm n+ 1 sets price so high that Dn+1n+1(p) < 0, demands for
firms i < n+ 1 are consistently adjusted as if firm n+ 1 set price pˆn+1 that realizes it exactly zero
demand. This will give rise to actual demands which are continuous as a firm raises its price through
the level at which it receives zero demand, and the market effectively has one less player. We shall
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see in Remark 2.3 that a common way of generating demand systems through a representative
consumer’s utility maximization problem yields a demand system with this consistency property.
In Definition 2.1, we do not necessarily know that pˆn+1 exists for all n. We shall prove that
they do exist in Proposition 2.2, but first we need to make one additional assumption.
Assumption 2.4. For all n ∈ [1, N − 1] and all i = 1, . . . , n, we assume ∂Dni∂pi < 0.
We will see in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 that the other natural properties of Assumptions 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 are inherited by the lower level demand functions. However, it is necessary to assume
that lower level demand functions are decreasing in each player’s own price.
Proposition 2.2. For each n ∈ [1, N−1], there exists a finite “choke price” pˆn+1(p1, . . . , pn) where
Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn, pˆn+1) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Proposition 2.3 (Inherited Demand Properties). The functions Dni , as defined in Definition 2.1,
are smooth in all variables, and
∂Dni
∂pj
> 0 for i 6= j, and i = 1, . . . , n.
The functions Dni also inherit the symmetry of the functions D
N
i from Assumption 2.2. Fur-
thermore, they inherit the ordering of demand shown in Proposition 2.1. That is, for a fixed vector
of prices p, ordered such that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN , we have for any 1 ≤ n ≤ N
Dn1 (p1, . . . , pn) ≥ Dn2 (p1, . . . , pn) ≥ · · · ≥ Dnn (p1, . . . , pn) .
Proof. The smoothness of the functions Dni clearly comes directly from that of D
N
i . Furthermore,
the symmetry of these functions is also clearly inherited. To show the positive transverse derivative,
we simply compute. We show only at the level N − 1; for all n ∈ [1, N − 1], the property will follow
in the exact same way from the function at the level n+ 1 using Assumption 2.4. We first take the
derivative of Eqn. (1) with respect to pj for j 6= N , which gives
∂pˆN
∂pj
= − ∂D
N
N /∂pj
∂DNN /∂pN
> 0, because
∂DNN
∂pj
> 0 and
∂DNN
∂pN
< 0.
Then, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and j ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} \ {i}, we have
∂DN−1i
∂pj
=
∂DNi
∂pj
+
∂DNi
∂pN
∂pˆN
∂pj
.
This is positive because of Assumption 2.1 and because ∂pˆN∂pj > 0 for any j 6= N . With these
properties, the ordering of demands follows by applying the exact same proof as Proposition 2.1. 
We can now specify completely the demand function that each firm faces for a given set of
prices.
Definition 2.2. (Actual Demands) Given an ordered price vector p:
• If DNN (p) ≥ 0, then Di(p) = DNi (p) for all i = 1, . . . , N .
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• Otherwise, find n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} such that
Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn, pn+1) < 0, and D
n
n (p1, . . . , pn) ≥ 0.
For such an n, the actual demands of firms n + 1, . . . , N are equal to zero, and Dni give the
actual demands for each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Di(p) =
{
Dni (p1, p2, . . . , pn) for i = 1, . . . , n
0 for i = n+ 1, . . . , N
• If no such n exists, then Di(p) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
2.2 Example: Linear Demand
We present demand functions that are affine in the prices of all firms. This is the demand structure
we will use in the dynamic game of the following sections. For fixed N , we start with positive
parameters A,B,C such that B > (N − 1)C. This latter condition on the parameters will be
justified in what follows. With these parameters, we define
DNi (p1, . . . , pN ) , A−Bpi + C
∑
j 6=i
pj , for i = 1, . . . , N. (2)
Notice that DNN (0, . . . , 0) = A > 0, and D
N
i is of the form given in Remark 2.1. Therefore the
demand functions satisfy Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
Proposition 2.4. For each n ∈ [1, N − 1], we have
Dni (p1, . . . , pn) = an − bnpi + cn
∑
j 6=i
j≤n
pj , for i = 1, . . . , n, (3)
where, for 2 ≤ n ≤ N ,
an−1 = an
(
1 +
cn
bn
)
, bn−1 = bn
(
1− c
2
n
b2n
)
, cn−1 = cn
(
1 +
cn
bn
)
, (4)
with aN = A, bN = B and cN = C.
Proof. Using Definition 2.1, we solve for the choke price pˆN by setting D
N
N in Eqn. (2) to zero and
solving for pN . This results in pˆN = B
−1
(
A+ C
∑N−1
i=1 pi
)
. Substituting into Eqn. (2) we obtain,
for i = 1, . . . , N − 1,
DN−1i (p1, . . . , pN−1) = A
(
1 +
C
B
)
−B
(
1− C
2
B2
)
pi + C
(
1 +
C
B
) ∑
j 6=i
j≤N−1
pj ,
which establishes Eqn. (4) for n = N . We can repeat this procedure for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, where we
find pˆn+1 = b
−1
n+1 (an+1 + cn+1
∑n
i=1 pi), and this results in the demand system at the level n being
given by Eqn. (3) with the recursively defined parameters given in Eqn. (4). 
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Proposition 2.5. The explicit solution of the recursion (4) is given by
an =
α
β + (n− 1)γ , bn =
β + (n− 2)γ
(β + (n− 1)γ)(β − γ) , cn =
γ
(β + (n− 1)γ)(β − γ) , (5)
where we define
γ =
C
(B − (N − 1)C) (B + C) , α = γ ·A ·
(
B
C
+ 1
)
, β = γ ·
(
B
C
− (N − 2)
)
. (6)
Proof. Simple algebra shows that the expressions in Eqn. (5) satisfy the recursions in Eqn. (4). All
that remains to show is that an, bn, cn are positive and well-defined. By examination of Eqn. (5),
this will be the case provided α, β, γ are positive, and β > γ because of the denominator in the
last two expressions in Eqn. (5). We see from the first expression in Eqn. (6) that α > 0 if γ > 0.
Furthermore, we have that β > γ, and therefore β > 0 if γ > 0 and if B > (N − 1)C. This is
exactly the condition we assumed above on the parameters B and C. Therefore, we need only show
that γ > 0, but this again will be true if B > (N − 1)C. Hence, we have that an, bn, cn are positive
for all n. 
Remark 2.2. Note that Assumption 2.4 is satisfied by the demand functions in Eqn. (3) because
∂Dni
∂pi
= −bn < 0, for all n ≤ N and i ≤ n.
Remark 2.3 (Generating Demand Systems). One can generate demand systems that satisfy our
assumptions by starting with a utility function and using the utility maximization problem of a rep-
resentative consumer. Let U(q) : RN+ → R be a smooth and strictly concave utility function, where
q is a vector representing quantities of the different products. We assume that a representative
consumer solves the problem of maximizing utility of consumption minus the cost of that consump-
tion: maxq U(q) − pq. One then obtains inverse demands from the first order conditions of this
maximization problem p = ∇U . The Jacobian of the inverse demand system equals the Hessian of
U , which implies the system is invertible. We obtain the direct demand system {DNi } by inverting
this system for quantity as a function of price. Concavity of U implies ∂DNi /∂pi < 0, but we cannot
tell directly from U if ∂DNi /∂pj ≥ 0 holds for j 6= i. Therefore, an additional assumption must
be made at the level of the demand functions in order to model substitute goods. However, the
consistency property in Definition 2.1 is guaranteed. Suppose firm N is removed from the utility
function, then the demand functions {DN−1i } derived this way, inverting ∇U after setting qN = 0,
are consistent with the {DNi }, and similarly for the lower level demand functions {Dni }. The linear
system of demand introduced in Section 2.2 can be obtained by using the quadratic utility function
U(q) = α
N∑
i=1
qi − 1
2
β N∑
i=1
q2i + γ
∑∑
i 6=j
qiqj
 .
While it is not necessary to assume that demand is derived from utility, it can be shown that,
under some mild conditions, given a system of demand, there exist preferences that rationalize that
demand, which result in a utility function consistent with that demand system. See Mas-Colell
et al. [26, Section 3.H] for more details.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium
We now analyze the static Bertrand game. Each firm i ∈ {1, . . . , N} has an associated constant
marginal cost, denoted by si. We denote by s the vector of costs with ith element equal to si. Each
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firm chooses its price to maximize profit in a non-cooperative manner, but they must do so while
taking into account the actions of all other firms. Firms choose prices to maximize profit in the
sense of Nash equilibrium. The profit function Πi : RN × R→ R+ for firm i is given by
Πi (p1, p2, . . . , pN , si) , Di(p) · (pi − si) , (7)
where Di(p) was defined using the procedure in Section 2.1.
In order to simplify exposition, we assume, possibly after a suitable relabeling, that firms are
ordered by costs: 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sN .
Definition 2.3. A vector of prices p? = (p?1, p
?
2, . . . , p
?
N ), is a Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand
game if
p?i = si whenever Di (p
?) = 0, (8)
and
p?i = arg max
p≥si
Πi
(
p?1, p
?
2, . . . , p
?
i−1, p, p
?
i+1, . . . , p
?
N , si
)
(9)
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Eqn. (9) says the Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of best-responses. Eqn. (8) says that whenever
a firm receives zero demand in equilibrium, it sets its price equal to cost, which is a best-response,
meaning it satisfies Eqn. (9). This makes the best-response p?i a well-defined function.
In the game with heterogeneous costs, some firms may receive zero demand, and so we first con-
sider subgames which, for n = 1, . . . , N , involve only the first n players. Let p?,n =
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n ,
sn+1, . . . , sN ), where the first n components solve the Nash equilibrium problem with profit func-
tions Πni (p1, . . . , pn) = D
n
i (p1, . . . , pn) · (pi−si) and Dni , introduced in Definition 2.1, is the demand
function for the n-player game. In other words,
p?,ni = arg max
p≥0
Πni
(
p?,n1 , p
?,n
2 , . . . , p
?,n
i−1, p, p
?,n
i+1, . . . , p
?,n
n
)
, i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
Assumption 2.5. We assume that, for each n = 1, . . . , N , there exists a unique solution to the
system of maximization problems in Eqn. (10).
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique best-response function for each player are
existence of a unique solution to the first-order conditions:
∂Di
∂pi
(p?,n)
(
p?,ni − si
)
+Di(p
?,n) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (11)
and strict concavity of Πni as a function of pi. It is straightforward to show that the latter is implied
if we adopt the assumption thatDni (p1, . . . , pn) is concave as a function of pi; some weaker conditions
on the Dni are discussed in Vives [27, Chapter 6], but we do not pursue those here. Finally, for a
unique intersection of the best-reponse functions, hence a unique solution to Eqn. (10), a well-known
sufficient condition is diagonal dominance of the Hessian of Πni :
∂2Πni
∂p2i
+
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ ∂2Πni∂pi∂pj
∣∣∣∣ < 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (12)
Again, we refer to Vives [27] for details.
In the subgames, prices p?,ni are non-negative, but the resulting demands may be negative.
Therefore, these are only initial candidates for the Nash equilibrium of our problem, but they are
used in the proof of the next section. We will also provide an example of such a Nash equilibrium
under linear demand functions.
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2.3.1 Existence and Construction of Nash Equilibrium
Let p? denote the vector of prices in equilibrium. We will see that the Nash Equilibrium will be
one of three types:
〈I〉 All N firms price above cost. In this case, p?i > si for all i = 1, . . . , N , and the Nash
equilibrium is simply the N -player interior Nash equilibrium given by p? =
(
p?,N1 , . . . , p
?,N
N
)
,
where the p?,Ni solve Eqn. (10) with n = N .
〈II〉 For some 0 ≤ n < N , firms 1, . . . , n price strictly above cost and the remaining firms set price
equal to cost. In other words, p?i > si for i = 1, . . . , n, and pj = sj for j = n + 1, . . . , N .
The first n firms play the interior n-player sub-game equilibrium as if firms n + 1, . . . , N do
not exist. These firms are completely ignorable because their costs are too high. The Nash
equilibrium is p? =
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n , sn+1, . . . , sN
)
.
〈III〉 For some (k, n) such that 0 ≤ k < n ≤ N , firms 1, . . . , k price strictly above cost (if k = 0 then
no firms price strictly above cost), and the remaining firms set price equal to cost. In other
words, p?i > si for i = 1, . . . , k and p
?
j = sj for j = k + 1, . . . , N . This type differs from Type
〈II〉 in that firms k + 1, . . . , n are not ignorable: their presence is felt in the pricing decisions
of firms 1, . . . , k, and we say that firms k+ 1, . . . , n are on the boundary. On the other hand,
firms n + 1, . . . , N are completely ignorable. This case arises when firms k + 1, . . . , n would
want to price above cost if they were ignored, but they do not want to price above cost in
the full sub-game that includes them as a player.
In order to characterize Type 〈III〉 equilibria, for any fixed n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for any k =
1, . . . , n, let pb,n,n−k, be the vector where for every i = 1, . . . , k we have
pb,n,n−ki = arg max
p≥si
Dni
(
pb,n,n−k1 , . . . , p
b,n,n−k
i−1 , p, p
b,n,n−k
i+1 , . . . , p
b,n,n−k
k , sk+1, . . . , sn
)
· (p− si) , (13)
and for which pb,n,n−kj = sj for j = k + 1, . . . , N . This means that firms 1, . . . , k are setting
prices by maximizing profit in the sense of Nash equilibrium given that firms k + 1, . . . , n are on
the boundary and firms n + 1, . . . , N are ignorable. We note that this solution is different to the
solution p?,k because the demand function used in their profit maximization is Dni and not D
k
i .
This is exactly what we mean by the fact that firms k + 1, . . . , n are on the boundary and hence
not ignored. Explicitly, the superscript (b, n, n− k) stands for boundary, n firms entering into the
demand function, and n− k firms on the boundary, i.e. not ignorable.
The following lemma shows that if firm n would see non-positive demand at cost, for some fixed
set of prices p1, . . . , pn−1, then, at the same fixed prices, and with firm n pricing at cost, firm (n+1)
will also see non-positive demand at cost.
Lemma 2.1. Fix an n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and fix p1, . . . , pn−1. Suppose Dnn(p1, . . . , pn−1, sn) ≤ 0.
Then Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, sn+1) ≤ 0.
Proof. Recall that pˆn+1 is the unique price as a function of (p1, . . . , pn) that equates the demand
of firm (n+ 1) to zero. For the fixed p1, . . . , pn−1 and sn, we have
Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, pˆn+1) = 0. (14)
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Then,
Dnn (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn) = D
n+1
n (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, pˆn+1)
= Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, pˆn+1, sn)
≥ Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, pˆn+1, sn+1)
≥ Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, sn+1) ,
where the last inequality holds if sn ≤ pˆn+1. Alternatively, if sn ≥ pˆn+1, we note that then we also
have sn+1 ≥ sn ≥ pˆn+1 and thus
Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, sn+1) ≤ Dn+1n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, pˆn+1) = 0.
Hence, regardless of the relative size of sn and pˆn+1 we have D
n+1
n+1 (p1, . . . , pn−1, sn, sn+1) ≤ 0. 
Theorem 2.1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium to the Bertrand game.
Proof. We begin with the lowest cost firm. His equilibrium candidate price is given by p?,11 . If p
?,1
1
is less than or equal to s1 then the optimal response of firm 1 is to set price equal to cost. By
Lemma 2.1, every other firm has negative demand at cost. Hence, it is the best response of all firms
to set price at cost. In this case, costs are so high that no firms receive demand in equilibrium, and
we have
p? = (s1, . . . , sN ) , (15)
which is of Type 〈II〉 with n = 0. Alternatively, if p?,11 > s1, then additional firms may also want
to price above cost.
Suppose that for some n ≥ 1 we have p?,ni > si for all i = 1, . . . , n. Consider the pricing decision
of firm n+ 1. We find that if
Dn+1n+1
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n , sn+1
) ≤ 0, (16)
then firm (n+1) will not want to price above cost because even at cost they do not receive demand.
Furthermore, by Lemma 2.1, firms n+2, . . . , N will also not receive demand and their best response
will thus be to set price at cost. Hence, we have a Type 〈II〉 equilibrium given by
p? =
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n , sn+1, . . . , sN
)
.
However, if
Dn+1n+1
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n , sn+1
)
> 0, (17)
then firm n + 1 may want to price above cost. We must then distinguish two cases. The first is
where p?,n+1n+1 > sn+1. Then firm (n + 1) will want to price according to the interior candidate
price, and all firms with lower cost will also price at their (n + 1)-firm interior candidate prices.
At this point, we have to consider the entry decision of the next firm, thereby moving back to the
beginning of this inductive step if n+ 1 < N . However, if n+ 1 = N then we stop and we have a
Type 〈I〉 equilibrium given by
p? =
(
p?,N1 , . . . , p
?,N
N
)
.
The second case is where p?,n+1n+1 ≤ sn+1. Here, by Eqn. (17), firm (n+ 1) wants to price above
cost when the first n firms are pricing at their interior candidate prices in the n-firm game. But,
its cost is too high to receive any demand at its (n+ 1)-firm candidate price. We say that this firm
is on the boundary. Therefore, firm (n + 1) must set price equal to sn+1, because if they were to
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price strictly above cost it would have to be an interior candidate price, and we already have seen
that this is not possible for the given sn+1. We have thus ruled out both Type 〈I〉 and Type 〈II〉
equilibria, and the equilibrium of this game is of Type 〈III〉.
Hence, the remaining firms solve for an equilibrium with the (n+1)-firm demand functions, but
with pn+1 fixed at sn+1. This will result in the prices p
b,n+1,1
i for firms i = 1, . . . , n. If p
b,n+1,1
n ≥ sn,
then we can stop and we have
p? =
(
pb,n+1,11 , . . . , p
b,n+1,1
n , sn+1, . . . , sN
)
, (18)
again where we know that all firms with cost greater than firm (n+ 1) price at cost by Lemma 2.1.
However, suppose to the contrary that pb,n+1,1n < sn. Then sn is too high to sustain a boundary
solution with player n pricing above cost, and we must consider the situation where there is more
than one firm on the boundary. We find k ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that
pb,n+1,n−kk+1 < sk+1 and p
b,n+1,n−k+1
k ≥ sk. (19)
Here k represents the number of firms setting price according to the boundary optimization Eqn. (13),
and n−k+ 1 is the number of firms on the boundary. From Eqn. (19), the best response of each of
the n− k + 1 boundary firms is to price at cost and, by Lemma 2.1, for the remaining higher cost
firms to also price at cost. Meanwhile firms 1, . . . , k choose prices pb,n+1,n−k+1i which are greater
than their costs. Thus, we have
p? =
(
pb,n+1,n−k+11 , . . . , p
b,n+1,n−k+1
k , sk+1, . . . , sn, sn+1, . . . , sN
)
. (20)

2.3.2 Nash Equilibrium with Linear Demand
We give explicit expressions for the Nash equilibrium to the Bertrand game under the linear demand
functions discussed in Section 2.2.
Proposition 2.6. There exists a unique equilibrium to the Bertrand game with linear demand.
The type 〈I〉 and 〈II〉 candidate solutions are given by
p?,ni =
1
(2bn + cn)
[
an + cn
nan + bn
∑n
m=1 sm
(2bn − (n− 1)cn) + bnsi
]
. (21)
The type 〈III〉 candidate solutions are given by
pb,n+1,n+1−ki =
1
(2bn+1 + cn+1)
[(
an+1 + cn+1
n+1∑
m=k+1
sm
)
+cn+1
n
(
an+1 + cn+1
∑n+1
m=k+1 sm
)
+ bn+1
∑k
m=1 sm
2bn+1 − (k − 1)cn+1
+ bn+1si
 . (22)
The Nash equilibrium is constructed as follows:
• If s1 > a1b1 , then p? = (s1, . . . , sN ).
• Else, find n such that p?,ni > si,∀i = 1, . . . , n, and p?,n+1n+1 ≤ sn+1.
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– If sn+1 ≥ b−1n+1
(
an+1 + cn+1
∑n
i=1 p
?,n
i
)
, then p? =
(
p?,n1 , . . . , p
?,n
n , sn+1, . . . , sN
)
,
– Else,
◦ if pb,n+1,1n > sn, then p? =
(
pb,n+1,11 , . . . , p
b,n+1,1
n , sn+1, . . . , sN
)
,
◦ else, find k < n such that
pb,n+1,n+1−ki > si for all i = 1, . . . , k, and p
b,n+1,n+1−(k+1)
k+1 < sk+1.
Then p? =
(
pb,n+1,n+1−k1 , . . . , p
b,n+1,n+1−k
k , sk+1, . . . , sN
)
.
Proof. We first show that the first-order condition equation, Eqn. (11), has a unique solution. The
second-order conditions that these are maxima for each player are satisfied as a straightforward
consequence of bn > 0. In order to find a formula for p
?,n
i , we first solve the unconstrained individual
firm profit maximization problem to get the best-response function for each firm. This results in
p?,ni =
1
2
an
bn
+
cn
bn
∑
j 6=i
p?,nj + si
 . (23)
In order to find the intersection of all these functions, we sum Eqn. (23) over i to obtain
p¯?,n =
nan + bns¯n
(2bn − (n− 1)cn) , (24)
where s¯n =
∑n
j=1 sj , the sum of the first n firms’ costs, and p¯
?,n =
∑n
j=1 p
?,n
i . Rewriting Eqn. (23)
in terms of p¯?,n gives
p?,ni =
1
(2bn + cn)
[an + cnp¯
?,n + bnsi] . (25)
Thus, our candidate solution p?,ni , found by solving Eqn. (11), is given by Eqn. (25) for i = 1, . . . , n
and p?,ni = si for i = n + 1, . . . , N . This establishes the formulas in Eqn. (21). The p
?,n
i are
necessarily positive because 2bn > (n − 1)cn which follows easily from Eqn. (5) and our standing
assumption that B > (N − 1)C (which is equivalent to β > γ). Therefore we have a unique Nash
equilibrium of the subgame with positive prices.
The boundary formulas Eqn. (22) are established similarly, and the remainder of the proposition
follows from the proof of Theorem 2.1. 
Remark 2.4. The condition for positive prices in the proof, namely 2bn > (n − 1)cn, is exactly
the diagonally dominant condition of Eqn. (12).
2.4 Discussion of the Static Game
The boundary type of solution we discuss above does not appear to exist in the literature on
Bertrand games, which has primarily focused on cases where Type 〈I〉 equilibria occur. For example
in the typically-studied case where firms are taken to have equal costs, the boundary would not exist
because all firms would either price at cost, or they would all play an interior Nash equilibrium.
However, this boundary type of solution may occur when firms have asymmetric costs. Consider
a firm who prices strictly above cost in a boundary equilibrium. One can think of this firm as
using price to discourage competition from other smaller or less efficient firms. In the simplest case
of two players, a potential monopolist sets a price below the optimal monopoly price in order to
discourage the entry of a possible competitor. Such practices are usually termed predatory pricing.
12
For further discussion, we illustrate with the linear duopoly. We assume we have linear demand
functions in the sense of Section 2.2 with N = 2 for fixed constants A,B and C, with B > C. We
use the result of Proposition 2.5 to re-parameterize the problem in terms of constants α, β and γ.
For a fixed cost s, the optimal price and realized demand in the monopoly problem are given by:
p?M (s) =
1
2
(α+ s) , D?M (s) =
1
2β
(α− s) . (26)
In terms of the players’ costs (s1, s2), the interior equilibrium duopoly prices and demands are given
by
p?,2i (s1, s2) = α
(
β − γ
2β − γ
)
+
β
(4β2 − γ2) (2βsi + γsj) , i = 1, 2; j 6= i, (27)
D?i (s1, s2) =
α
β + γ
− β
(β2 − γ2)p
?
i (s1, s2) +
γ
(β2 − γ2)p
?
j (s1, s2). (28)
Finally, if the boundary case arises, the equilibrium prices are given by
pb,2,1i (s1, s2) =
1
2
(
α(β − γ) + γsj
β
+ si
)
, and p?j = sj , (29)
which can be found from the two-player profit maximization problem under the assumption that
one’s opponent sets price equal to cost. If i denotes the lower cost firm such that 0 ≤ si ≤ sj , then
the Nash equilibrium price strategies are given by
p?i = max
si,

p?M (si) if Dj(p
?
M (si), sj) ≤ 0
pb,2,1i (s1, s2) if Dj(p
?
M (si), sj) > 0 and p
?,2
j ≤ sj
p?,2i else
 , (30)
and p?j = max
(
sj , p
?,2
j
)
. In the case s1 = s2 = s, this simplifies to p
?
1 = p
?
2 = max
(
s, α(β−γ)+βs2β−γ
)
.
We examine the above solutions in more detail. Let us first note that if p?,21 < s1, then a
duopoly is not sustainable. This occurs if and only if
φ1(s1) ,
(
2β2 − γ2
βγ
)
s1 − α
βγ
(β − γ) (2β + γ) > s2. (31)
Similarly, we note that if D?1 (s1, p
?
M (s2)) < 0, then Firm 2 has a monopoly. This occurs if and only
if
φ2(s1) ,
2β
γ
s1 − α
γ
(2β − γ) > s2. (32)
Therefore, for s2 ∈
(
φ2(s1), φ
1(s1)
)
, Firm 2 cannot sustain a monopoly, but neither is a duopoly
sustainable. This is the situation where Firm 1 is on the boundary. By the symmetry of the game,
we can also use φ1 and φ2 to characterize where Firm 2 is on the boundary, and where Firm 1
has a monopoly. We can fully characterize the type of game in the space of (s1, s2) through these
two functions. First, note φ1(α) = φ2(α) = α, and φ1(s) − φ2(s) = γβ (α− s). We see in Figure 1
that as long as |s1 − s2| is relatively small, a duopoly will be sustainable. We also note that the
dependence of φ1(s) − φ2(s) on γ implies that as γ decreases, the size of the boundary area will
also decrease. Consider a fixed set of costs (s1, s2) such that s1 > s2 and s2 = φ
2(s1). This is the
point where the game transitions from the boundary solution to the monopoly solution. Using the
monopoly price and boundary price given above, we find at this transition point that
p?M
(
φ2(s1)
)− pb,2,12 (s1, φ2(s1)) = γ2β (α− s1) > 0,
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Figure 1: Characterization of solution in cost space
and thus there is a jump in the equilibrium price of Firm 2 as the game transitions from Firm 1 on
the boundary to Firm 2 being a monopoly.
3 Differential Game
The single-period game provides only the beginning of an insight into the pricing decisions of
firms. In reality, firms make their decisions dynamically through time. We consider a market in
which there are N possible firms, each of which has a fixed lifetime capacity of production at time
t = 0 denoted by xi(0), and where xi(t) denotes the remaining capacity at time t. The firms in
this market produce only a single good and thus, one can use the terminology firm and product
interchangably. In this sense, xi(t) represents the remaining amount of a certain product that will
be sold. Therefore, when xi = 0, no more of the product will be sold, the firm has exhausted its
capacity and is out of business. Thus, xi is not to be confused with inventory which is typically
replenishable. Our point of view abstracts from the microscopic level of inventory fluctuations to
the level of lifetime production. For simplicity of notation, we consider the cost of production in
the dynamic game to be zero, but we will see there are shadow costs associated with scarcity of
goods as they run down.
Each firm i chooses a Markovian dynamic pricing strategy, pi = pi(x(t)) where x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t)).
This is the price at which consumers can purchase a unit of the good produced by firm i. The firms
in this market produce substitute, but not perfectly substitutable, goods. As in Section 2, given
these prices, each firm i = 1, . . . , N expects the market to demand at a rate Di(p1, p2, . . . , pN ), but
actual demands from the market may see short term unpredictable fluctuations. We model them
in the simplest way:
di(t) = Di (p1, p2, . . . , pN )− σi˙i(t), (33)
where {˙i(t)}i=1,...,N are correlated Gaussian white noise sequences. Consequently, the dynamics
of the lifetime capacity of the firms is given by dxi(t) = −di(t) dt. This leads to the controlled
14
stochastic differential equations
dxi(t) = −Di
(
p1(x(t)), . . . , pN (x(t))
)
dt+ σi dWi(t), if xi > 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (34)
where {Wi(t)}i=1,...,N are correlated Brownian motions. If xi(t) = 0 for any t, then xi(s) = 0 for all
s ≥ t: random shocks cannot resuscitate a firm that has gone out of business. The use of this type
of additive shock in demand is common in the economics literature, for example Arrow et al. [1].
The use of a Brownian motion for the demand flow can be found in various sources, for example
Bather [3]. An alternative model for demand uncertainty in the literature is to consider the process
of customer arrival as a Poisson process, see for example Besbes and Zeevi [8] for recent work in
this direction.
3.1 The Linear Demand Duopoly Game
Now that we have fully specified the dynamics of the firms’ remaining lifetime capacities, we move
on to the actual study of the dynamic game. The analysis can be done for an arbitrary number of
players N , but, to simplify the exposition, we focus on the case N = 2, i.e. duopoly. Additionally,
we focus on the case of a linear demand system. This will allow us to be more explicit in our actual
results. See Appendix C for a discussion of the N -player linear demand game.
Given initial lifetime capacity xi(0) > 0, player i = 1, 2 seeks to maximize his expected dis-
counted lifetime profit
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtpi(x(t))Di (p1 (x(t)) , p2 (x(t))) 1{xi(t)>0} dt
}
, (35)
where r > 0 is a discount rate and Di are the actual demands constructed in Definition 2.2 using
the linear demand functions given in Section 2.2. We restrict attention to Markov Perfect Nash
equilibria in order to rule out equilibria with undesirable properties such as non-credible threats
(see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole [19, Chapter 13]). This means that we are looking for a
pair (p¯?1(x(t)), p¯
?
2(x(t))) such that for i = 1, 2, j 6= i, and for all x(0) ∈ R2+,
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtp¯?i (x(t))Di
(
p¯?i (x(t)) , p¯
?
j (x(t))
)
1{xi(t)>0} dt
}
≥
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtpi(x(t))Di
(
pi (x(t)) , p¯
?
j (x(t))
)
1{xi(t)>0} dt
}
,
for any Markov strategy pi of player i. (The overbar in p¯
?
i is used to distinguish the dynamic Nash
equilibrium from the equilibrium of the static game in Section 2).
We define the value functions of the two firms by the coupled optimization problems
Vi(x1, x2) = sup
pi≥0
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtpi(x(t))Di (p1 (x(t)) , p2 (x(t))) 1{x1(t)>0} dt
}
, i = 1, 2. (36)
Then, by a dynamic programming argument for nonzero-sum differential games (see, for example,
Friedman [17, Section 8.2], Bas¸ar and Olsder [2, Section 6.5.2], or Dockner et al. [13, Section 4.2]),
these value functions, if they have sufficient regularity, satisfy the following system of PDEs:
LVi + sup
pi≥0
{
−D1 (p1, p2) ∂Vi
∂x1
−D2 (p1, p2) ∂Vi
∂x2
+ piDi (p1, p2)
}
− rVi = 0 (37)
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for i = 1, 2, where
L = 1
2
σ21
∂2
∂x21
+ ρσ1σ2
∂2
∂x1∂x2
+
1
2
σ22
∂2
∂x22
,
and ρ is the correlation coefficient of the Brownian motions: E {dW1dW2} = ρ dt.
When the parameter γ is not too large, both players are close to being monopolists in disjoint
markets for their own goods, and we can expect that the dynamic Nash equilibrium (p¯?1(x(t)), p¯
?
2(x(t)))
is such that both demands Di (p¯
?
1(x(t)), p¯
?
2(x(t))) remain strictly positive while xi(t) > 0. We shall
find that this is indeed the case for small enough γ in the asymptotic solution of Section 3.3 and
the numerical solutions in Section 4.
When both demands are positive, we see easily from Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 that the linear
demand functions satisfy the relationship
Dj(p1, p2) = DM (pj)− γ
β
Di(p1, p2), j 6= i, (38)
which allows us to re-write Eqn. (37) as
LVi −DM (pj)∂Vi
∂xj
+ sup
pi≥0
{
Di (p1, p2) ·
[
pi −
(
∂Vi
∂xi
− γ
β
∂Vi
∂xj
)]}
− rVi = 0, i = 1, 2. (39)
We now observe that the Nash equilibrium problem in the two PDEs in Eqn. (39) is exactly a static
Nash equilibrium problem for a two-player Bertand game, but with costs
Si (x) ,
∂Vi
∂xi
(x)− γ
β
∂Vi
∂xj
(x) , i = 1, 2. (40)
Given the unique Nash equilibrium p?i (S1 (x) , S2 (x)) of this static problem from Proposition
2.6, the PDE system is simply
LVi −DM
(
p?j (S1 (x) , S2 (x))
) ∂Vi
∂xj
+Gi (S1 (x) , S2 (x))− rVi = 0, i, j = 1, 2; j 6= i, (41)
where we define Gi(s1, s2) = Di (p
?
1, p
?
2) (p
?
i − si) as the equilibrium profit function of the static
game.
The domain of the PDE problem is x1 > 0, x2 > 0. When one firm runs out of capacity, the
other has a monopoly. We denote by vM (x) the value function of a monopolist with remaining
capacity x, which we will study in the next section. On x2 = 0, x1 > 0, Firm 1 has a monopoly, so
V2(x1, 0) ≡ 0 and V1(x1, 0) = vM (x1). On x1 = 0, x2 > 0, Firm 2 has a monopoly, so V1(0, x2) ≡ 0
and V2(0, x2) = vM (x2).
As is well known, it is extremely difficult to provide existence and regularity results for systems
of PDEs arising from nonzero-sum differential games and we do not attempt to do so here. Some
results on weak solutions are found in Bensoussan and Frehse [5, 4], for related problems on smooth
bounded domains with absorbing boundary conditions. In contrast, zero-sum games, which are
characterized by a scalar equation, have a well studied viscosity theory; see, for example Fleming
and Souganidis [16]. Mean Field Games are an intermediate case characterized by a system of two
PDEs and some regularity results exist (Lasry and Lions [25]). We also mention some analytical
progress can be made in nonzero-sum stochastic differential games of Dynkin type, that is games
on stopping times; see Hamade`ne and Zhang [21].
In the stochastic game, the intuition is that the elliptic operator L will provide regularity
which is supported in the numerical results of Section 4. In the non-stochastic game, when γ is
small enough, we obtain regular asymptotic approximations in Section 3.3 because the strength of
competition between firms is weak.
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3.2 Monopoly Problem
When one firm has a monopoly over the market, the dynamics for the firm’s remaining capacity,
x(t), is given by
dx(t) = −DM (p(x(t))) dt+ σdW (t),
where W is a Brownian motion. The value function of the monopoly firm as a function of its initial
capacity x0 = x ∈ R+ is defined to be the maximum expected discounted lifetime profit
vM (x) , sup
p≥0
E
{∫ ∞
0
e−rtp (x(t))DM (p (x(t))) 1{x(t)>0} dt
}
. (42)
The associated Bellman equation for this stochastic control problem is the ODE
1
2
σ2v′′M + sup
p≥0
{
DM (p)
(
p− v′M
)}− rvM = 0,
with boundary condition vM (0) = 0. We look for solutions in which limx→∞ v′M (x) = 0.
As we are working in the case of linear demands, we find from Eqn. (26):
1
2
σ2v′′M +
1
4β
(
v′M − α
)2 − rvM = 0. (43)
In the case σ = 0, the monopoly ODE is given by
1
4β
(
v′M − α
)2 − rvM = 0, (44)
and we can find an explicit solution.
Proposition 3.1. The value function for the monopoly with σ = 0 is
vM (x) =
α2
4βr
[
W
(−e−µx−1)+ 1]2 , (45)
where µ = (2βr)/α and W is the Lambert W function defined by the relation Y = W(Y )eW(Y )
with domain Y ≥ −e−1.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the Lambert W function satisfies W(z) < 0 for z ∈
[−e−1, 0), W (−e−1) = −1, W(0) = 0, and W′(z) = W(z)/ (z (1 + W(z))) for z > −e−1, and
therefore that Eqn. (45) indeed satisfies Eqn. (44) and the boundary condition vM (0) = 0. We
note that the restriction of the domain of W to [−e−1,∞) is sufficient as the argument to W in
Eqn. (45) is equal to −e−1 when x = 0 and increases to zero as x increases to infinity. 
Inserting s = v′M = −αW
(−e−µx−1), into the optimal monopoly price strategy and demand
functions given in Eqn. (26), we find p?M (v
′
M (x)) =
α
2
(
1−W (−e−µx−1)). We plot this function in
Figure 2. We note that the price at the zero capacity level is given by α, and in the limit as x→∞,
p?M → α2 . The demand is given by D?M (v′M (x)) = 12β (α− v′M (x)) = α2β
(
1 + W
(−e−µx−1)), which
is strictly positive for all x > 0.
17
0 5 10 152.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
Monopoly Price Function
x
Pr
ice
 
 
Price
α
α / 2
Figure 2: p?M (x) vs x for σ = 0
3.3 Small Degree of Substitutability Asymptotics under Deterministic Demand
We further analyze the non-stochastic (or ordinary) differential game (σ1 = σ2 = 0) in which the
monopoly problem is explicitly solvable, as in Proposition 3.1. We first note that γ = 0 is equivalent
to stating that firms have independent goods in the sense that they operate in markets without
competing with one another. Hence, they have monopolies in their own markets, and it is clear that
Vi(x1, x2) = vM (xi), where vM is the monopoly value function given in Eqn. (45). When γ > 0,
firms produce goods that are substitutable and are actually in competition with one another. We
construct a perturbation expansion around the non-competitive case for small γ > 0 to view the
effects of a small amount of competition.
Recall our PDE system Eqn. (41), with L ≡ 0. We look for an approximation to the solution
of this system of PDEs of the form
Vi(x1, x2) = vM (xi) + γv
(1)
i (x1, x2) + γ
2v
(2)
i (x1, x2) + · · · . (46)
We use the static equilibrium price and demand functions that are given in Eqn. (27)-Eqn. (28),
because we are working under the standing assumption that we have a Type 〈I〉 equilibrium. We
first expand Si (x) = s
(0)
i (x) + γs
(1)
i (x) + γ
2s
(2)
i (x) + · · · , where from Eqn. (40), we have
s
(0)
i = v
′
M (xi), s
(1)
i =
∂v
(1)
i
∂xi
, s
(2)
i =
∂v
(2)
i
∂xi
− 1
β
∂v
(1)
i
∂xj
. (47)
Making use of Eqn. (26), the relevant expansions in powers of γ are
p?i (s1, s2) = p
?
M (s
(0)
i )−
γ
2
D?M (s
(0)
j + 2βs
(1)
i )−
γ2
4β
D?M (s
(0)
i + 2βs
(1)
j + 4β
2s
(2)
i ) + · · · , (48)
D?i (s1, s2) = D
?
M (s
(0)
i )−
γ
2β
D?M (s
(0)
j − 2βs(1)i )−
3γ2
4β2
D?M (s
(0)
i +
2
3
βs
(1)
j −
4
3
β2s
(2)
i ) + · · · ,(49)
DM (p
?
i ) = D
?
M (s
(0)
i ) +
γ
2β
D?M (s
(0)
j + 2βs
(1)
j ) +
γ2
4β2
D?M (s
(0)
i + 2βs
(1)
j + 4β
2s
(2)
i ) + · · · . (50)
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We define
q(x) , D?M
(
v′M (x)
)
=
1
2β
(
α− v′M (x)
)
. (51)
Then, inserting Eqn. (46) into Eqn. (41), using Eqn. (48)-Eqn. (50), and comparing terms in γ and
γ2, give that v
(1)
i and v
(2)
i satisfy
q(x1)
∂v
(1)
i
∂x1
+ q(x2)
∂v
(1)
i
∂x2
+ rv
(1)
i = −q(x1)q(x2), (52)
q(x1)
∂v
(2)
i
∂x1
+ q(x2)
∂v
(2)
i
∂x2
+ rv
(2)
i =
1
2β
(
∂v
(1)
j
∂xj
+ q(xi)
)
·
(
∂v
(1)
i
∂xj
+ q(xi)
)
+
1
4β
(
∂v
(1)
i
∂xi
+ q(xj)
)2
− 3
2β
(q(xi))
2 , (53)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, with boundary conditions v(1)1 (x1, 0) = v(2)1 (x1, 0) = 0 and v(1)1 (0, x2) =
v
(2)
1 (0, x2) = 0.
Proposition 3.2. The solution v
(1)
i is given, for x1 > x2, by
v
(1)
1 (x1, x2) =
α2
4β2r
(
e−rQ(x2) (1 + rQ(x2))− e−rQ(x1) (1− rQ(x2)) + e−r(Q(x1)+Q(x2)) − 1
)
, (54)
where
Q(x) ,
∫ x
0
1
q(u)
du = −1
r
log
(−W (−e−µx−1)) , (55)
and, for x2 ≥ x1, by reversing the roles of x1 and x2 in Eqn. (54). The solution for v(1)2 is clearly
the same, i.e. v
(1)
2 ≡ v(1)1 .
Proof. The first step is to make the change of variables (ξ, η) = (Q(x1), Q(x2)) and u(ξ, η) =
e
r
2
(ξ+η)v
(1)
i
(
Q−1(ξ), Q−1(η)
)
in Eqn. (52), which gives
∂u
∂ξ
+
∂u
∂η
= f(ξ, η), ξ, η > 0; u(ξ, 0) = u(0, η) = 0, (56)
where f(ξ, η) , −e r2 (ξ+η)q (Q−1(ξ)) q (Q−1(η)) . We see by the symmetry of this equation that
u(ξ, η) = u(η, ξ). We first suppose that ξ > η and solve the PDE with the boundary condition
u(ξ, 0) = 0. The other half of the solution can be obtained by symmetry. The solution is
u(ξ, η) =
∫ η
0
f(s+ ξ − η, s) ds = −
∫ η
0
e
r
2
(ξ−η+2s)q
(
Q−1 (s+ ξ − η)) q (Q−1 (s)) ds. (57)
By the definition of q(x) in Eqn. (51) and vM in Eqn. (45), we have q(x) =
α
2β
[
1 + W
(−e−µx−1)].
This leads to Eqn. (55) since the range of W
(−e−µx−1) is (−1, 0). From properties of the Lambert
W function, it follows easily that −e−rs = W
(
−e−µQ−1(s)−1
)
, and hence
q
(
Q−1(s)
)
=
α
2β
(
1 + W
(
−e−µQ−1(s)−1
))
=
α
2β
(
1− e−rs) . (58)
We can now easily compute the integral in Eqn. (57). After restoring the transformations, we
obtain Eqn. (54). 
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Remark 3.1. It can be verified by direct computation that the solutions v
(1)
i in Proposition 3.2
are C1 on the line x1 = x2. One can also solve the PDEs in Eqn. (53) to obtain a second-order
correction for the value functions. We present this solution in Appendix B.
Remark 3.2. While we do not give a formal convergence proof for the asymptotic approximation,
we note that, since v
(1)
i and v
(2)
i are bounded with bounded continuous first-derivatives, the error
terms Ei defined by Vi = vM + γv
(1)
i + γ
2v
(2)
i + Ei solve
q(x1)
∂Ei
∂x1
+ q(x2)
∂Ei
∂x2
+ rEi = O(γ
3)
with Ei(x1, 0) = Ei(0, x2) = 0. It follows from here that, for fixed x1, x2 > 0, |Ei(x1, x2)| = O(γ3)
as γ ↓ 0.
3.4 Discussion of Asymptotic Solution
We plot v
(1)
1 in Figure 3(a). Intuitively, it decreases from zero on the axes, because the first order
correction decreases the value of the game due to the transition from a one-player monopoly to a
two-player duopoly game. Hence, the greater the value of γ, the lower is the lifetime profit of an
individual firm.
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Figure 3: v
(1)
1 and v
(2)
1 . First- and second-order value function corrections.
We plot v
(2)
1 in Figure 3(b). It is again negative everywhere. Hence, the second-order correction
serves to further decrease the value of the game from just the first-order approximation. We plot in
Figure 4 the difference between v
(2)
1 and v
(2)
2 . We do not make the same comparison for v
(1)
i because
v
(1)
1 −v(1)2 ≡ 0. We see from this figure that the sign of the difference is equal to the sign of x1−x2.
Consider the situation in which Firm 1 has larger lifetime capacity, x1 > x2. In the absence of
competition, he has a larger value function, vM (x1) > vM (x2). Introducing competition lowers his
value by less than it lowers the value of the smaller firm. Therefore, competition serves to enhance
the advantage of the larger firm. Of course, when two firms both have large remaining capacities,
the inequality between firms does not have that much importance. It is only when one or both
firms have small amounts of capacity remaining that inequalities across firms become magnified.
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1 −v(2)2 . Difference between Firm 1 and Firm 2 second-order value function corrections.
For the remaining figures of this section we use the expansion up to order γ. We plot in Figure
5(a) the equilibrium price strategy of Firm 1 as a function of x2 for various values of γ using the
first two terms of Eqn. (48). For γ = 0, p¯?1 does not change with x2 as the goods are independent.
For increasing γ, as we would expect, the prices decrease at a faster rate as a function of x2 because
p¯?1 is more sensitive to the price of firm 2 when γ is larger. In Figure 5(b), we plot the instantaneous
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Price and Profit for Firm 1
profit for Firm 1, p¯?1D1(p¯
?
1, p¯
?
2). Each line shows the impact at a fixed (x1, x2) of increasing γ, and
we see from the slopes that the effect on reducing instantaneous profit is greater when x2 is larger.
Hence, competition, as measured by γ, only has bite when the competitor has comparable lifetime
capacity levels.
Thus, when one considers the effect of competition on profit and prices, there are two main
pieces of information one must take into account. The first is the degree of substitutability between
goods. Fundamentally this means how similar is your good to your competitor’s. For example, one
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expects γ to be large in the market for gasoline, because gas at one station is essentially the same
as gas at a station across the street. The goods are not perfect substitutes because of travel costs,
brand loyalty, and a host of other reasons. However, in the market for CDs, one expects a very
low degree of substitutability, because an individual artist’s music is typically highly differentiated
from that of another artist, even within a specific genre. It is reasonable to assume in such a market
that γ is quite low.
The second main piece of information is how credible is your competition. In this model, the
proxy for a credible competitor is their level of lifetime capacity. If your competitor has very little
lifetime capacity, then it stands to reason that regardless of how similar their good is to your own
good, you will be a monopoly in short order. In contrast, if your competitor has a large amount
of lifetime capacity, then they are a very credible threat to your business. As such, you must take
such them very seriously even if their good is highly differentiated (but still substitutable) with
your good. This can be seen in Figure 5(b) as even with γ = 0.1, when x2 is large relative to x1,
the instantaneous profit is much less than when x2 is relatively small.
In Figure 6, we plot the solution to dx1dt = −D1 (p¯?1(x), p¯?2(x)), where we have used our expansion
of order γ. We present the path of x1(t) over time for various different values of γ starting from
x1(0) = x2(0) = 10. We see that as γ increases, the time of the game increases. That is, it
takes more time for Firm 1 to deplete their lifetime capacity when the degree of substitutability is
greater. We can see this also by looking at the path of both demand and prices over the time of
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Figure 6: Path of Firm 1 Lifetime Capacity over time with x1(0) = x2(0) = 10 for various values
of γ
the game. These are plotted in Figures 7 (a) and (b), respectively. We see that, for an individual
firm, increasing the value of γ drives down the price, while the demand first decreases and then
increases. Common across all levels of γ, we see that as the capacity of the firm diminishes over
time, the price increases while demand decreases.
Finally, we remark that one can confirm that the resulting demands from the asymptotic ap-
proximation for both firms are strictly positive in equilibrium. Therefore, our previous assumption
on strictly positive demands is justified at least for γ small enough.
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4 Numerical Analysis
We have been able to capture many of the qualitative features of the model analytically in the
case of deterministic demand using the asymptotic expansions of the previous section. However, in
order to fully analyze the stochastic model we solve the full PDE system numerically. With these
solutions, we then simulate paths of the game.
4.1 Finite Difference Solution of the PDE System
We employ fully implicit finite differences to find solutions V1 and V2 to the system in Eqn. (41).
We can then use finite difference approximations to the derivatives of these value functions to
obtain optimal price strategy functions and the resulting optimal demand functions. We use the
parameter values α = 6, β = 1, r = 1, σ1 = σ2 = 0.6 and ρ = 0.1. The demands remain strictly
positive for this choice of parameters and therefore, in this case, both firms are active participants
in equilibrium.
For given levels of capacity x1 and x2, we define θ , tan−1 (x2/x1). This is the angle in (x1, x2)
space that corresponds to the given capacity levels. We plot in Figure 8 (a), the price of Firm 1
as a function of this θ for several values of γ. We also plot the optimal demand as a function of
θ in Figure 8 (b). These figures allow us to analyze price and demand effects for a fixed level of
overall capacity in the market. At one end of the spectrum, θ = 0, we have that Firm 1 controls
all of the capacity in the market. On the other end, θ = pi/2, Firm 2 controls all of the capacity.
The price of Firm 1 decreases initially as θ increases, provided there is competition in the market,
i.e. γ > 0. However, the price starts to increase once θ moves beyond pi/4 and Firm 1 holds the
minority share of the available capacity in the market. Furthermore, price decreases at a greater
rate for higher levels of γ. This implies that the optimal price strategies result in the lowest prices
when substitutability is high, i.e. γ is large, and when all firms in a market are of the same relative
size, i.e. θ is close to pi/4. Increasing the number of firms in a market, thereby increasing the
level of competition, does not always have a large effect on consumer welfare. This is because if an
additional firm enters a market with a small capacity when there already exist large capacity firms,
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Figure 8: Price and Demand for Firm 1 as a function of θ for various values of γ
then essentially this means they are not credible competitors to the large firms and therefore prices
do not necessarily have to adjust by a large amount to account for this additional competition.
On the other hand, we see from these figures, for a given fixed level of total market capacity,
consumers are always better off if the capacity is spread evenly across firms, provided the firms
produce substitute goods (i.e. γ > 0). Consumers therefore face the best possible situation when
there exist multiple firms in a market whose goods have a high degree of substitutability and whose
relative sizes are the close to the same.
Figures 9 (a) and (b) are the contours of the optimal price strategy for Firm 1 for two different
values of γ. The strategy changes from charging a constant price as a function of x2 when γ = 0, to
charging a price that is decreasing in x2 for γ = 0.4. This is as expected because prices should reflect
the credibility of one’s competitor when that competitor produces a good which is substitutable
with one’s own good. We see that although prices are decreasing in both x1 and x2, they decrease
at a faster rate with respect to x1.
4.2 Game Simulations
We can use our numerical solution of the value functions to obtain numerical versions of the equi-
librium prices, p¯?i (x(t)). These in turn can be used to obtain numerical versions of the equilibrium
capacity trajectories over time by making use of Eqn. (34), i.e.
dxi(t) = −Di (p¯?1(x1(t), x2(t)), p¯?2(x1(t), x2(t))) dt+ σi dWi(t), i = 1, 2.
We simulate paths of the Brownian motions in order to obtain paths of the game over time. We
present an example of these paths in Figure 10(a) for γ = 0.4. This is just one example but
it displays many features of the game. Here we started both firms with an initial capacity of
x1(0) = x2(0) = 10. Over time these decrease, but because of the stochastic component of demand,
we see that at any given moment in time, we cannot say with certainty which firm will necessarily
have a higher level of capacity. In this example, initially Firm 2 gains an advantage, however we see
as time progresses that Firm 2 runs out of capacity before Firm 1, and hence for a period of time
Firm 1 has a monopoly. For a fixed realization of the Brownian path, we plot in Figure 10(b), the
path of the capacity for Firm 1 for various values of γ. We see that as γ increases, the time until the
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Figure 9: Contours of Firm 1 Price Strategy for γ = 0 and 0.4.
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capacity of Firm 1 is exhausted, also appears to increase. This effect, where increased competition
prolongs the lifetime of firms, is consistent with what we saw in Figure 6 in the deterministic game.
5 Conclusion
We have studied nonzero-sum stochastic differential games arising from Bertrand competitions, in
particular, the case of a duopoly with linear demand functions. By considering the case where
there is a small degree of substitutability between the firms’ goods, we are able to construct an
asymptotic approximation that captures many of the qualitative features of the ordinary differential
game. Numerical solutions further provide insight into the stochastic case and where there is a
higher degree of substitutability. In our study of the dynamic game, we concentrated on the case
where both firms have positive demand in equilibrium. As we saw in the static game, it is possible
for there to arise cases where this does not occur. However, the study of such cases remains an
interesting open question in the analysis of these dynamic Bertrand games.
These tools allow us to quantify the effects of substitutability and relative firm size on prices,
demands and profits. In particular, we find that consumers benefit the most when a market is
structured with many firms of the same relative size producing highly substitutable goods. However,
a large degree of substitutability does not always lead to large drops in price, for example when
two firms have a large difference in their size. That is, consumers benefit the most when firms are
competing with other firms whom they deem to be credible threats. A competitor is a credible
threat only if they have capacity large enough to match their competitors. For example, the
existence of a very small coffee shop does not greatly affect the pricing decisions of Starbucks.
It is of interest to extend the analysis here to markets with nonlinear demand systems as well as
to random demand environments. By the latter, we mean that baseline demand and substitutability
may vary stochastically over time with economic conditions or consumer tastes. For example, in
the linear demand system Eqn. (2), there may be fluctuations in the intercept parameter A, which
is a measure of the general level of demand due to business cycles and recessions, or in C/B, which
is the measure of substitutability, as certain brands fall out of fashion, for example what Toyota
is experiencing in 2010. Finally, an important related direction is to connect, in a probabilistic
way, prices to the mechanism of customer arrival, for example, by making the arrival intensity a
function of prices. Such models have been used in a variety of applications for the single-player
price setting problem. However, their use in competitive markets leads to multi-player stochastic
differential games with jumps, and is a direction we are currently pursuing.
A Proof of Proposition 2.2
We have assumed that pˆN exists. We show that this implies pˆN−1 exists. The result for all n will
then follow by induction. Fix p1, . . . , pN−2 and denote this vector of prices by ρ. Let pN−1 be an
arbitrary price. We denote pˆN (ρ, pN−1) by p˜. We then have two cases, depending on pN−1, under
which we wish to show DN−1N−1 (ρ, pN−1) < 0. The first case is pN−1 > pˆN (ρ, p˜), which implies
DN−1N−1 (ρ, pN−1) = D
N
N−1 (ρ, pN−1, p˜) = D
N
N (ρ, p˜, pN−1) < D
N
N (ρ, p˜, pˆ (ρ, p˜)) = 0.
The second case we must consider is the reverse inequality, i.e. pN−1 < pˆN (ρ, p˜). This implies
0 = DNN (ρ, pN−1, p˜) > D
N
N (ρ, pˆ (ρ, p˜) , p˜) = D
N
N−1 (ρ, p˜, pˆ (ρ, p˜)) = D
N−1
N−1 (ρ, p˜) .
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Hence, regardless of the relative size of pN−1 and pˆN (ρ, p˜), we have that DN−1N−1(p) is negative for
some vector of prices p. We have ignored the case pN−1 = pˆN (ρ, p˜), because this would change the
above inequalities to equalities and we would have the choke price we are looking for.
We know by Assumption 2.4 that DN−1N−1 is a decreasing function of pN−1. We have shown above
that there exists some vector of prices p such that DN−1N−1(p) < 0. We thus need only show that
there exists some vector of prices p where DN−1N−1(p) > 0. This will establish the existence of the
choke price.
Fix some vector of prices p¯ = (p1, . . . , pN−2, 0), where p1, . . . , pN−2 are arbitrary prices. Denote
by 0 the vector in RN−1 of all zeros. Recall that DNN (0, 0) > DNN (0, pˆN (0)) = 0. This implies
pˆN (0) > 0. We then have
DN−1N−1 (p¯) = D
N
N−1 (p¯, pˆN (p¯)) ≥ DNN−1 (p¯, pˆN (0)) > DNN−1 (p¯, 0) ≥ DNN−1 (0, 0) = DNN (0, 0) > 0.
Hence, for the vector p¯ we have that DN−1N−1(p¯) is positive. Therefore, there must exist some pˆN−1
for every set of prices p1, . . . , pN−2 such that DN−1N−1 (p1, . . . , pN−2, pˆN−1) = 0.
B Second-order approximation
We give the solution of the PDEs Eqn. (53) for v
(2)
i . Using the solution to v
(1)
i found in Proposition
3.2, making the same change of variables (ξ, η) = (Q(x1), Q(x2)) and solving leads to
v
(2)
1 =
α2
8β3
e−rQ(x2)
[
−Q(x2)
2
2
(
2rerQ(x2)
erQ(x2) − 1 +
rϕ1
1− e−rQ(x1)
)
− Q(x2)(1− ϕ1)
1− e−rQ(x1)
+
3
2r
(
erQ(x2) − 1
)
− (1− ϕ1)
2
2r
(
erQ(x2)
(
1− e−rQ(x1))) + 1− ϕ12r
−3
r
(
erQ(x2) − ϕ21e−rQ(x2) − 1 + ϕ21 − 2ϕ1rQ(x2)
)]
. (59)
for x1 > x2 where ϕ1 = exp {−r (Q(x1)−Q(x2))}. For x2 > x1,
v
(2)
1 =
α2
8β3
e−rQ(x1)
[
−Q(x1)
2
2
(
rerQ(x1)
erQ(x1) − 1 +
2rϕ2
1− e−rQ(x2)
)
− 2Q(x1)(1− ϕ2)
1− e−rQ(x2)
+
3
2r
(
erQ(x1) − 1
)
− (1− ϕ2)
2
rerQ(x1)
(
1− e−rQ(x2)) + 1− ϕ2r
−3
r
(
erQ(x1) − 2rQ(x1)− e−rQ(x1)
)]
. (60)
where ϕ2 = exp {−r (Q(x2)−Q(x1))}. We omit the details of this lengthy calculation.
C N-player Stochastic Differential Game with Linear Demands
Consider the N -player dynamic Bertrand game under the linear demand system introduced in
Section 3. Within this section we explicitly assume that all firms participate in equilibrium, i.e.
all firms receive positive demand. In the language of Section 2, this would mean that the resulting
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dynamic equilibrium is of Type 〈I〉. Let Vi(x) denote the value functions defined by the N -player
analog of Eqn. (36). Then, the associated PDE system, analog of Eqn. (37), is
LVi + sup
pi≥0
{
−
N∑
k=1
DNk (p)
∂Vi
∂xk
+ piD
N
i (p)
}
− rVi = 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (61)
where we explicitly denote the dependence of the demand functions on N to indicate the size of
the vector p in the argument. Here,
L = 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Σij
∂2Vi
∂xi∂xj
, (62)
where (Σij)i,j=1,...,N is the covariance matrix between the Brownian motions in Eqn. (34).
For a fixed i, we note that we can write
DNj (p) = −
C
B
DNi (p) +A
(
1 +
C
B
)
−B
(
1− C
2
B2
)
pj + C
(
1 +
C
B
)∑
k 6=j
k 6=i
pk
= −C
B
DNi (p) +D
N−1
pii(j)
(p−i) , (63)
where p−i = p\{pi} and
pii(k) =
{
k, k < i
k − 1, k > i. (64)
This decomposition means that one can represent a firm’s demand function at the level N as a linear
combination of another given firm’s demand function at the level N and their own demand function
at the level N − 1 with the given firm being removed. This is a consequence of the consistency of
demand functions and the existence of choke prices.
Hence, using this decomposition, we have, for i = 1, . . . , N
LVi −
N∑
k 6=i
DN−1pii(k)(p−i)
∂Vi
∂xk
+ sup
pi≥0
DNi (p)
pi − ∂Vi
∂xi
+
C
B
∑
k 6=i
∂Vi
∂xk
− rVi = 0. (65)
Therefore, we can use the results of the static Bertrand game to write the PDEs as
LVi −
N∑
k 6=i
DN−1pii(k)(p
?
−i)
∂Vi
∂xk
+GNi (s1, . . . , sN ) = rVi (66)
where the prices p? are the solutions of the N -player static game with costs
Si(x) =
∂Vi
∂xi
− C
B
∑
k 6=i
∂Vi
∂xk
, i = 1, . . . , N (67)
and with corresponding profit functions GNi (s1, . . . , sN ) = D
N
i (p
?) (p?i − si).
The boundary conditions for this PDE depends on the PDEs that result by considering a market
with N − 1 firms. That is, on any edge of an orthant where xi = 0 and xj > 0 for all j 6= i, we
have Vi ≡ 0 and that Vj solve the same PDE problem except where firm i is removed and thus
there are N − 1 firms in the market. This is similar to the duopoly problem where the boundary
condition depends on the monopoly problem. The remaining conditions can be worked out in a
similar fashion.
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